バングラデシュにおける女子高校生退学率にたいする社会文化的要因の影響 by Sarker  MD.ShahidulIslam
The Impact of Socio-Cultural Factors on
Dropout Rates for Girls at the Secondary
School Level in Bangladesh
著者 Sarker  MD.ShahidulIslam
学位授与機関 Tohoku University
学位授与番号 11301甲第15519号
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10097/58746
 1 
 
Doctoral Thesis 
 
 
 
The Impact of Socio-Cultural Factors on Dropout Rates for 
Girls at the Secondary School Level in Bangladesh  
 
 
 
By  
 
 
 
Md. Shahidul Islam Sarker 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
at Tohoku University 
Graduate School of Arts and Letters 
Summer Term 2013 
 
 
 i 
 
Acknowledgement 
I am appreciative to many people who helped me to complete this thesis. First 
of all, my supervisor Dr. Yoshimichi Sato, who has supervised my work and provide 
valuable advice and support. I also want to thank the academic staff of the Department 
of Behavioural Sciences for their comments and guidance. 
I am grateful to the Center for the Study of Social Stratification and Inequality 
for the academic and financial support in my research.  
I also want to thank all the staffs of this center and especially to Ms. Airin Izumi for the 
support in dealing with all the paperwork and bureaucratic procedures relevant my 
research. 
Finally, I am grateful to all the friends, relatives and colleagues who supported 
me, and who are so many that I cannot list all their names in this short 
acknowledgement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
 
Table of Contents  
1. Introduction…………………………………………………..1 
 1.1. Cultural Practices in the Marriage market of Bangladesh..6 
 (i) Dowry in the Marriage Market……………………………….6 
 (ii) Determinants of Dowry………………………………………9 
 (iii) Female hypergamy in Marriage Matching in Bangladesh.15 
 1.2. Girls’ Secondary Education in Bangladesh……………….17 
 1.3. Research Question ………………..………………………...21 
 1.4. Hypothesis……………...……………………………………22 
2. Dropout Risk factors………………………………………..25 
 2.1. Individual Domain Factors…………………………………26 
 2.2. Family / Household Domain Factors………………………30 
 2.3. School Domain Factors……………………………………..34 
 2.4. Community Dominant Factor……………………………...37 
 2.5. Limitations in the Literature……………………………….38 
3. Data and Methods…………………………………………..42 
 3.1. Data…………………………………………………..42 
 3.2. Definition of Variables……………………………………...44  
 iii 
 
 3.3. Analytical Method… ……………………………………... .47 
4. Analyses……………………………………………………...49 
 4.1. Descriptive Statistics………………………………………..49 
 4.2. Multivariate Analysis……………………………………….52 
4.2.1. Model 1 (competing model)………………………………52  
4.2.2. Model 2 (hypothesized model)……………………………54 
5. Discussion……………………………………………………58 
6. Conclusion…………………………………………………...64 
Appendix 
 (i). Model Results ………………………….…………………….69 
(ii). Reversed Model……………………………………………..73 
 (iii).Mechanism of Female Hypergamy and Dowry in the 
Marriage Market…… ………………………………………74 
References………………………………………………………………79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 1. Introduction   
 Dropping out of school is a global phenomenon among girls. A UNICEF 
(2004) report indicates that the number of children who are not in school, in South Asia 
is the fifth highest in the world and 70.00 percent of these children are girls. South Asia 
has the worst gender disparity in the rates of secondary school enrollment and 
completion of any third world regions. Bangladesh is a densely populated, low-income 
country in South Asia. The educational background of the country is characterized by 
low enrollment and low school completion among the female population. The school 
dropout rate for girls is significantly high, especially in Bangladesh, where 57.15 
percent of girls in secondary education level leave school before the completion of 
grade X (Bangladesh Education Bureau of Statistics report, 2010). (The academic 
period for the secondary school level in Bangladesh is from grade VI to grade X.)      
A survey conducted by the Academy for Educational Development, (1993) in 
Bangladesh identified five main factors that constrain female enrollment in secondary 
school in Bangladesh. The key obstacles cited by the surveyed families included tuition 
fees 42.00 percent, book expenses 20.00 percent, transportation 11.00 percent, the 
presence of a son in the family 9.00 percent, and the expenses of uniforms 4.00 percent. 
These findings suggest that four out of the five main constraints are related to costs. 
Female education is simply perceived as less worthwhile than the education of males. 
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Girls are expected to marry, leave home and become mothers and housewives. Thus, 
they are considered poor investments. In response to this situation, the government of 
Bangladesh implemented a female secondary stipend program (FSP) in 1994 to increase 
female enrollment at the secondary school level. The program provides a monthly 
stipend and waives tuition fees for female students from grade VI to grade X to 
encourage girls to continue their education. According to the Bangladesh Bureau of 
Education Statistics (BANBEIS), the female enrollment rate increased from 52.00 
percent in 1990 to 80.00 percent in 2005.  
 Although Bangladesh has had the most significant achievement in the 
secondary school enrollment of girls due to the implementation of this policy, the 
dropout rate is still high. The BANBEIS reported that the dropout rate for girls from 
secondary education was 86.03 percent in 1999, 86.00 percent in 2001, 80.00 percent in 
2005 and 57.15 percent in 2010. In the respect of declining BANBEIS reported that the 
dropout rate of girls decreased in 2010, however, declined slowly.  
 The FSP requires parents to sign a pledge that their enrolled daughters will not 
be marred before 18 years of age, which is the minimum marriage age for girls in 
Bangladesh. Although this program contributes to gender equity in enrollment in 
secondary education, it does not improve completion rates because some parents send 
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their daughters to school only until desirable opportunities for marriage arise, at which 
point they violate the pledge (Program Report, 2008). In a global review of marriage 
and education trends in contemporary developing societies (LIoyd, 2005) identifies 
Bangladesh as the only country in which marriage is a significant reason for school 
dropout among girls. However, there is no empirical research indicating why parents 
encourage their daughters to marry early during their schooling, leading girls to drop 
out of school instead of completing their education. Therefore, the main purpose of this 
study is to identify the underlying causes for girls’ early departure from school despite 
taking initiative the government to improve the education of girls. In other words, 
despite the implementation of the FSP by the government of Bangladesh to improve 
girls’ education, why do several of girls leave school before graduation?  
 Holmes (2003) found that girls sometimes receive less education than boys and 
tend to drop out or are withdrawn earlier for socio-cultural reasons. This study adopts 
this perspective to determine the underlying causes of dropping out by focusing on the 
socio-cultural practices that occur in the marriage market in Bangladesh. Thus, this 
study aims to determine how the cultural background of the marriage market 
discourages parents in Bangladesh from continuing their daughters’ schooling.   
 This study considers two of the most important cultural practices of the 
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marriage market in Bangladesh. Firstly, the custom of paying a dowry which goes from 
the bride’s family to the groom’s family; the groom’s qualification (educational level) is 
the determinant of the dowry amount. The second important normative practice is 
female hypergamy in the marriage market in Bangladesh. This practice requires brides 
to marry husbands with a higher or equal education level. However, educated grooms 
require a higher dowry amount in the marriage market of Bangladesh (Arends and Amin, 
2001). Consequently, female hypergamy acts as a vehicle for dowry inflation in the 
marriage market while educated brides require equally or more educated grooms, but 
more educated grooms require a higher amount of dowry. Caldwell and Reddy (1983) 
found that one sociological explanation for the existence of dowry at the individual 
level is hypergamic marriages, in which the bride’s family pays the dowry to marry 
their daughter to a higher-quality groom (with respect to education and status) than their 
daughter. 
 Although dowry payments also exist in the marriage market of other countries 
in South Asia, this type of dowry payment hinders girls’ education in Bangladesh 
because the existence of female hypergamy plays a crucial role in marriage matching 
patterns in Bangladesh. Because, dowry inflation which was caused by the existence of 
female hypergamy burdens the bride’s family when the economic transfer of dowry 
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payments go from the bride’s family to the groom’s family. On average, a marriage 
transfers 62.00 percent of the average annual household income of the bride’s family to 
the groom’s household in Bangladesh.  
 This study assumes that the mechanism of dowry and female hypergamy in the 
marriage market discourage from improving in daughters’ education since parents must 
need to maintain these expectations for both higher dowry payments and for their 
grooms’ education in the marriage market in order to continue with their daughters’ 
education. Although the custom of dowry payment and the norm of hymergamy 
prevalence in the marriage matching pattern of Bangladesh, however, it is important to 
explore empirically how these two perspectives impact on the dropout outcome for girls. 
From this viewpoint, this study examines the structure of the impact within two 
concepts. Firstly, dowry payment expectation of parents to grooms. Secondly, parents 
expectation for the educational level of the grooms. These two perspectives have been 
examined by conducting a structural equation modeling (SEM) to predict the school 
dropout outcome for girls in Bangladesh.   
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1.1. Cultural Practices in the Marriage Market in Bangladesh  
(i) Dowry in the Marriage Market  
 Marriage payments take various forms, but can be classified into two broad 
categories. Dowry transfers from the family of the bride to that of the groom are called 
“dowry” or groom price, and transfers from the groom’s side to the bride’s side are 
called “brideprice” (Goody, 1973). In Bangladesh, marriage decisions about daughters 
are controlled by parents, and marriages are typically arranged by the families of the 
groom and the bride. The custom of dowry payments is a common practice in the 
marriage market in Bangladesh. Dowries payments are paid by the bride’s family to the 
groom’s family, and it is determined by the grooms’ qualification. The groom’s 
qualification (education level) is the determinant of the dowry amount. This economic 
transfer burdens the bride’s family. Parents take out loans or may sell their land, 
furniture, ornaments and even their home to collect the enormous amount of money 
needed for their daughter’s marriage.  
 Several scholars have examined how the practice of dowry affects the marriage 
market in South Asia. Studies of the social characteristics of dowry payment societies, 
such as Goody’s (1973) sample of 857 preindustrial societies and Murdock’s (1967) 
sample of 1167 societies, confirm that dowry is mainly found in societies that exhibit 
substantial socioeconomic differentiation and class stratification. Brideprice-paying 
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societies have a strong female role in agriculture. In particular, Boserup (1970) argued 
that brideprice is found in societies in which agriculture relies on the active participation 
of women. In contrast, dowry is more common in heavy plow agriculture, where the 
role of women is limited. This connection is supported by the occurrence of brideprice 
in sub-Saharan Africa and China, where women’s participation in agriculture is 
relatively high. The reemergence of dowry occurred in South Asian countries when 
household-bound activities for women increased.  
  Becker (1991) found that the higher the dowry, the lower the optimal 
investment in their daughters’ human capital. Rajaraman (1983) described a dowry as a 
compensatory payment for the groom’s side. According to this perspective, dowry 
serves as a pre-mortem bequest. Botticini and Siow (2003) argued that in virilocal 
residential settings, where brides typically go to live with the husband’s household, 
dowries are given to daughters at the time of marriage to discourage them from claiming 
a share of the property at the time of the father’s death, a possibility that would lead the 
son to exert an excessively low effort for household property. Hence, dowries would 
prevent free-riding among siblings by making the son the residual claimant of the 
property. In contrast, Edlund (2001) argued that the need for dowry arises due to sex 
asymmetries in fecundity: parents would like to bequeath to children upon their death 
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but at that point, daughters may no longer be fecund. Finally, and related to the welfare 
approach, (Zhang and Chan, 1999) treated dowry as a pre-mortem bequest and argued 
that dowry remains the wife’s property and is given back to the wife in case of divorce. 
Rao (1993) argued that dowries have gone up due to an increase in the ratio of the 
number of females of marriageable age to the number of males of marriageable age.  
 Rozario (1998) argued that recent practices regarding dowry are related to a 
new surplus of unmarried women in Bangladesh. The shift from brideprice to dowry in 
the Bangladeshi context is a consequence of women’s revalorization, which is justified 
by the ideology of purity. The author notes that men began to postpone marriage until 
they were 25–30 years old because of increased urbanization and education. Men value 
female purity and do not want to marry women of their own age because they consider 
such women sexually suspect. Men can remain unmarried until the age of 30 or even 40 
years. In contrast, 20 years are considered the maximum age for a woman to be 
unmarried.  
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(ii) The Determinants of Dowry  
 Dowry typically arises in societies with endogamous marriage practices, in 
which men and women from families of equal social status marry. A Dowry thus 
becomes a means to maintain social status by attracting a husband of at least equal 
standing for one’s daughter. It correlates with strongly class-based social systems where 
higher-level individuals, by virtue of wealth, power, and superior hereditary status, do 
not willingly intermarry with those from lower levels. Botticini (1999) empirically 
verified the positive relationship between the amount of dowry transferred and both 
sides’ household wealth. In Guzzetti’s (2002) sample of dowries from 
fourteenth-century Venice, the average dowry increased with social class, with the 
dowries of nobles almost four times higher than those of commoners. Similar patterns 
are confirmed for modern India. Dowries are largest among the highest-ranking castes 
(Dalmia and Lawrence, 2005). Typically, in South Asia, the most important quality for a 
bride is a good appearance, whereas for a groom, it is his ability to earn a living and the 
level of his education (Caldwell and Reddy 1983). Empirical studies confirm a 
significant positive relationship between dowry levels and the education of Indian 
grooms (Dalmia and Lawrence, 2005), Bangladeshi grooms (Arunachalam and Logan, 
2006; Esteve Volart, 2004) and Pakistani grooms (Anderson, 2007). The same studies 
also suggest that the education of brides is significantly and positively related to dowry 
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levels, after controlling for family wealth and grooms’ characteristics. 
 
Figure 1-1. Amount of Dowry Payment by Brides’ Educational Level  
Source: Sajeda Amin, p. 7 (2008) 
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Figure 1- 2. Amount of Dowry Payment by Brides’ Age Level  
Source: Sajeda Amin, p. 7 (2008) 
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16,000 BDTK respectively to their marriage. Hence, there is a positive association 
between the bride’s age and the amount of the dowry in which a large amount of dowry 
is required for an aged bride. The incapability of the parents to arrange a dowry 
sometime makes delay to a girl’s marriage which leads to dowry inflation. 
Consequently, poor parents who are unable to support their families may therefore 
marry off their daughters as early as possible.  
One of the most commonly cited explanations for the rising of dowry is known 
as the 'marriage squeeze' which was first introduced by (Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell 
1983). The authors noted the popular perception among villagers that the appearance 
of dowry was due to a switch from a surplus of potential husbands to a surplus of 
potential brides beginning in the early 1970s. The key to understanding this argument 
is the demographic effects of declining mortality in a population in which men marry 
women from younger cohorts than their own. As mortality falls, younger cohorts will 
increase relative to older cohorts, leading to a broadening of the base of the age and a 
surplus of marriageable females. Thus, the forces of supply and demand will result in a 
switch from brideprice to dowry.  
 Empirical works by Rao (1993), Bhat and Halli (1999) support to the idea that 
the marriage squeeze was a major factor in the change from bride price to dowry in 
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India and Bangladesh, respectively. In fact, sex ratios have been found to be positively 
associated with the increase in real dowry payments. Lindenbaum (1981) suggested that 
the switch from bride price to dowry in Bangladesh was not necessarily a result of the 
pure shortage of men but rather due to competition for high-quality grooms. In rural 
Bangladesh, the socially accepted marriage age for a woman is lower than for a man. As 
the norm is that a man should marry a woman who is several years younger than him, 
this creates a tighter marriage market for women than men. As educational and work 
opportunities increased for men, parents desired their daughters to marry with educated 
men with urban jobs, as such men have higher and more certain incomes which are not 
subject to climactic cycles and which are paid monthly, and because the wives of such 
men will be freed from the ‘drudgery’ of rural work (Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell 
1983). In other words, in the “female competition” model of marriage payments, dowry 
acts as a vehicle through which a bride and her family can raise their status by marrying 
the daughter into a higher-status family, a practice known as hypergamy. Notably, it has 
been observed that the amount of dowry moves steeply with the desirable qualities of 
grooms (Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell 1983). The female competition model reflecting 
the fact that fathers of brides who have higher social or economic status can buy the 
quality grooms to marry their daughters. Hence, the qualities of the brides can 
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significantly affect the dowry amount. In Bangladesh, though dowry increases in 
tandem with age of women which placing pressure to parents to marry their daughters 
early. This may be especially true if the bride experiences lower social status of parents. 
(Huq and Amin 2001; Islam and Mahmud 1996).  
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(iii) Female Hypergamy in Marriage-Matching in Bangladesh  
 Female educational hypergamy refers to a marriage in which the woman has a 
lower level of educational attainment than her partner. The norm of hypergamy has been 
practiced in the marriage mating pattern in many parts of the world where women prefer 
to marry partners of higher status than themselves. Although the hypergamic tendency 
exists in marriage markets worldwide, it has particularly endured in Bangladesh. For 
instance, both the groom’s education level and age are expected to be higher than those 
of the bride or equal for the both of partners. Marriages in Bangladesh are arranged so 
that the parents control the mating process. When parents of brides and grooms 
participate in the mating process, in that situation, they not only consider the age and 
educational level of their children but also consider their individual background status. 
Although the groom’s parents expect lower or equal age and education levels for the 
bride than for the groom, they do not expect brides whose fathers have lower 
socioeconomic status than themselves. Therefore, though brides’ parents can expect 
equally or highly educated grooms for their daughters, they cannot expect grooms 
who’s parents have higher social status. The inferiority of wife-givers is a 
well-documented feature of the marriage market in Bangladesh (Gray 1997). 
Consequently, parents match their educated daughters with grooms whose parents have 
equal or lower status than them but whose age and education level is equal or higher 
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than that of the bride. Becker (1981) identifies the underlying causes of the prevalence 
of female hypergamy in his model. According to the Beckerian breadwinner model 
(1981), men specialize in production, and women specialize in reproduction. Hence, 
highly educated women are treated as less attractive marriage partners. However, 
unprecedented increases in education and female labor participation are challenging the 
consistency of the breadwinner model in modern societies (Oppenheimer, 1994). 
According to Oppenheimer, the economic value of a union lies in the pooling of 
resources rather than in specialization. 
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1.2. Girls’ Secondary Education in Bangladesh  
 In 1974, following independence, the newly formed government convened the 
“Dr. Qudrat-e-Khuda” (the name of an educationist) Education Commission to consider 
priorities for education policy. The commission’s report conceptualized women’s 
education as useful in domestic life and in traditional gender roles. The commission 
linked female education to such outcomes as child care, health and nutrition, and 
suitable vocations for women, including nursing and teaching (Jalaluddin and 
Chowdhury, 1997). In the years since the commission’s report, most policies aimed at 
promoting girls’ education have tended to follow these goals, with a recent emphasis on 
population control. Girls’ educational policies in Bangladesh have revealed that some 
parents are reluctant to invest in their daughters’ education. In a patriarchal system 
where daughters marry into another family, parents may decide that an investment in 
their daughters’ education is not a sound use of limited resources (Raynor, 2005). This 
tendency intensifies with poverty. As a result, policies have focused on financial 
incentives designed to get girls into school. In 1982, the “Bangladesh Association for 
Community Education” initiated experimental scholarship projects in a few areas in 
order to increase the enrollment of girls in rural areas in the secondary school level in 
the hope of delaying their marriages (Raynor and Chowdhury, 2006). This project 
became a nationwide Female Scholarship program (FSP) in 1994. After the initiation of 
 18 
 
this program, Bangladesh achieved gender parity in secondary school enrollment.  
 
Figure 1-3. Percentage of Students Enrolled in Secondary School in Bangladesh 
(1970-2010)  
Source: BANBEIS, 2010. 
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education as the most pressing problem facing the sector, for students in general and for 
girls in particular. The report estimates that girls lag behind boys by 7.40 percentage 
points in reaching grade X and by 12.20 percentage points in passing the Secondary 
School Certificate (SSC) examination, which is the nationwide yearly public 
examination in Bangladesh. Figure (1- 4) below shows this pattern in which 53.70% 
boys reach in grade X in 2005 whereas girls reach 46.30 percent in that grade. In 
addition, boys pass the SSC examination 56.10 percent in which girls pass 43.90 
percent.     
 
Figure 1- 4. Distribution of Percentage of Students in Grade X and Those Passed 
the SSC (secondary school certificate) examination in 2005.  
Source: BANBEIS, 2006. 
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Figure 1-5. Girls’ Promotion and Dropout Rates by Grades (VI-X), 2007  
Source: BANBEIS, 2007 
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1.3. Research Question  
 Literature on dowry payments confirms that there is a significant positive 
relationship between the dowry amount and the groom’s education level in Bangladesh 
(Arunachalam et al., 2006). In this situation, if girls attain higher education, a high 
dowry payment is required for her to marry an equally or highly educated groom, as 
required by the marriage mating pattern in the context of female hypergamy. 
Consequently, parents may strive to balance their daughter’s education level and their 
expectations regarding the groom’s education level so that dowry amount does not 
become too large. Therefore, the amount of schooling that daughters receive depends on 
the extent of the parents’ expectations for dowry payments and the prospective groom’s 
education level. Although the custom of dowry payments and the norm of hymergamy 
prevalence in the marriage matching patterns of Bangladesh, however, it is important to 
explore empirically how these two perspectives impact on the dropout outcome for 
girls. 
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1.4. Hypothesis  
  We assume that parental dowry payment expectation has an indirect effect on 
the outcome of dropped out in Bangladesh. This is because, it is well known that in 
Bangladesh, educated girls need higher dowry payment to be married.  Dowry is paid 
by the brides’ parents to the groom and highly educated grooms require higher amount 
of dowry in the marriage market. On the other hand, the norm for female hypergay 
exists in the marriage mating pattern in Bangladesh in which groom education level 
must be equal or higher compare to bride educational level. Consequently, marring a 
highly educated girl requires a higher or equally educated groom. However, a higher or 
equally educated groom requires higher amount of dowry in the marriage market which 
discourages parents from continuing their girls’ education. 
  In these circumstances, when daughters continue schooling; parents first fix 
how much dowry they will be able to pay to the groom as a groom price to daughters be 
married. On the other words, how educated grooms will be preferred to daughters’ 
marring before making this decision parents first need to decide how much dowry they 
will be able to pay. Therefore, parental expectations for groom’s education level is 
discarded or raised by the capability of dowry payment expectation of parents in the 
marriage market. Consequently, parental dowry payment expectations indirectly impacts 
on their daughters’ education and this effect mediated by the expectation of groom 
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education level.   
The Groom educational level has a causal effect on the dropout of girls. This is 
because, literature on marriage mating patterns show that marriage mating patterns are 
homogeneous and that highly educated groom typically chooses a highly educated bride. 
In the case of Bangladesh, though the norm for female hypergamy exists in the marriage 
mating patterns in which the groom’s educational level should be higher or equal 
compared to bride’s educational level. On the other hand, a lower educated groom 
chooses woman to marry who has equal or lower education compare to him. In rural 
Bangladesh, most of the potential grooms are less educated and consequently, making a 
perfect mating, demands of a less educated bride is rather higher than a higher educated 
bride which discourages schooling continuation for girls to parents. Hence, this study 
assumes that there is a negative causal relationship between the parental expectation for 
grooms’ educational level and dropout of girls in Bangladesh. 
 We argue that parental dowry payment expectations are determined by their 
background factors. In this respect, high parental income has a positive causal 
association on the dowry payment. This is because dowry payment is an economic 
transaction from one family to another family and in this respect parents who have 
higher economic capabilities would be typically expected to pay higher transactions 
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than those who have lower incomes. Similarly when marriage mating is a homogeneous, 
consequently, parents who have higher educational level typically prefer grooms those 
who have higher educational level to be married their daughters.   
Therefore, we assume that there is a positive causal relationship between the 
dowry payment expectation and groom education level in which the higher the dowry 
payment expectation increases the level of groom education, in turn; this reduces the 
dropout rate of girls. Hence, dowry has an indirect negative impact on the dropout 
outcome and by inference, then, the higher the amount of dowry payment expectation of 
parents, the less the dropout rate of daughters. Form this point of view we were pursued 
to examine the hypotheses as follows;  
H1. If the grooms’ educational level increased, the dropout rate decreased.   
H2. If the dowry payment expectation increased, the educational levels for the grooms 
increased. 
H3. If the dowry payment expectation increased, the dropout rate decreased. 
H4. If the parental educational level increased, the grooms’ educational level increased. 
H5. If the parental income level increased, the dowry payment expectation increased. 
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2. Dropout Risk factors  
 This study is pursued in order to clarify how the existing cultural practices in 
the marriage market impact on the early school dropout behavior of girls in Bangladesh. 
In this respect, this study emphasizes two cultural practices which happen in the 
marriage market; one is parental dowry payment expectation and another one is parental 
expectation for the educated groom. However, in order to clarify the effects of these two 
factors it is important to find out how other relevant factors affect the school dropout 
behavior for pupils in general. From this point of view this study reviews literature on 
school dropout issue to spell out the effects of parental dowry payment expectation and 
the expectation for educated grooms who marry girls. Factors affecting school dropout 
issue are broadly divided into four groups. These are (1) Individual domain risk factors, 
(2) Family/household domain risk factors, (3) School domain risk factors and (4) 
Community domain risk factors. The findings of these issues are described on the next 
pages. 
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2.1. Individual Domain Factors:  
 Students’ individual level factors which impact on early school dropout 
behavior are school engagement, school misbehaviors, working, health problem and 
preschool experience.  
 
School engagement   
 There are several of studies examine the connection between participation in 
extracurricular activities and school dropout. Data of the National Center for 
Educational Statistics of 1980 shows that the extracurricular activities that the students 
were participating in and separated them into four sub-groupings: athletics, fine arts, 
academic clubs, and vocational clubs. Students who participated in both athletics and 
fine arts extracurricular activities were found to be less likely to drop out than were 
those who did not participate. McNeal (1995) examined that Mexican-American 
students who were involved in any extracurricular activity were more likely to be 
enrolled in school than were those not involved in extracurricular activities. Mahoney 
and Cairns (1997) argued that engagement was reflected in participation in 
extracurricular activities and attributed school dropout to a lack of engagement. They 
found that dropouts participated in significantly fewer extracurricular activities at all 
grades than did non-dropouts.  
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School misbehaviors  
 School misbehavior was found to be a major predictor of dropout in. One 
group of researchers found that the characteristics that best distinguished dropouts from 
their academically similar peers who stayed in school were problem behaviors like 
truancy and lateness (Wehlage and Rutter, 1986). Results of a national study that 
followed 8
th
 graders through the 10
th
 grade showed that students who had been sent to 
the office for misbehaving were more likely to drop out than students who had never 
been sent to the office. In addition, the chances of dropping out dramatically increased 
with the number of times they got into trouble (Kaufman, 1992). Students who had been 
sent to the office once or twice in their 8
th
 grade were three and a half times as likely to 
drop out between the 8
th
 and 10
th
 grades as those who never were sent to the office. 
Those sent to the office more than twice during that year were six and a half times as 
likely to drop out between the 8
th
 and 10
th
 grades as those never sent to the office. 
Longitudinal studies provided clear evidence that misbehavior was a key factor in 
middle or high school. Findings for the impact of misbehavior in the elementary grades 
were less consistent. One study found misbehavior in 1
st
 and 10
th
 grades to be 
significant for dropout (Jimerson, 2000), while a second study found 9
th
 grade 
misbehavior significant but not 1st or 6th grade misbehavior (Alexander, 2001). Early 
aggression was also linked to dropout in two studies, particularly for males. One study 
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found that boys and girls who were rated as aggressive in the 7
th 
grade were much more 
likely to drop out of school before completing 11
th
 grade (Cairns and Neckerman, 
1989). 
 
Working  
 The major focus of most studies was examining whether working more hours 
increased the odds of dropping out of school. Although one study found that employed 
students, as a group, are more likely to drop out (McNeal, 1997) and another study 
found that the number of hours worked was a significant predictor of dropping out 
(Marsh, 1991), several studies found that only students who worked more than 20 hours 
a week were significantly more likely to drop out (D'Amico, 1984; Goldschmidt and 
Wang, 1999; Perreira, Harris, and Lee, 2006). Interestingly, some studies actually found 
that students who worked fewer than 20 hours (D'Amico, 1984), or fewer than seven 
hours (McNeal, 1997), or more consistently throughout their high school careers 
(Zimmer and Mortimer, 2006), were actually less likely to drop out of school, compared 
to students who worked more hours or did not work at all. 
 
Preschool experiences  
 Students’ past experiences may influence whether students drop out or graduate, 
largely through effects on their attitudes, behaviors, and educational performance. One 
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particular experience, participation in preschool, has been the subject of extensive 
research. A growing body of evidence has found that high quality preschool can not 
only improve school readiness and early school success, but long-term follow-up 
studies have found that preschool can also improve a wide range of adolescent and adult 
outcomes, including high school completion, and less criminal activity, reliance on 
welfare, and teen parenting (Barnett and Belfield, 2006; Gorey, 2001). Another review 
studiy found that, on average, preschool participation improved graduation rates by 22 
percentage points (Gorey, 2001).  
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2.2. Family / Household Domain Factors:  
 The school dropout affecting factors which come from students’ families these 
are family background characteristics, household size, parental involvement, 
parent-child involvement, parental decision for early marriage to daughters and 
household chores.  
 
Family background characteristics  
  Birdsall et al. (2005) and Boyle et al. (2002) explored that children from rich 
family are more likely to remain in school, whilst those who are from poor family are 
more likely never to have attended, or to drop out once they have enrolled. The National 
Center for Educational Statistics (NCES) found an association between family income 
and dropping out of school. High school students from families within the lowest 20.00 
percent income were 6 times as likely to dropout out of high school as those families 
located in the top 20.00 percent of the income range (Blue and Cook, 2004). Parental 
education level is one of the most consistent family background factors examined in 
relation to student educational outcomes. The higher the level of education of a 
student’s parents, the less likely the student was to drop out (Barro and Kolstad, 1987; 
Goldschmidt and Wang, 1999). In the High School and Beyond (HS&B) survey of 10th 
graders, an additional four years of schooling of a parent increased the chances of a 
student’s graduation by 15 percent (Barro and Kolstad, 1987). Six additional years of 
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schooling for either parent increased the chances of graduating by 25 percent. There 
were mixed results from data on inner-city students in Chicago on the impact of mothers’ 
education on dropout. In one analysis researchers found that a mother’s education had a 
significant impact on dropout for both males and females (Ensminger et al., 1996).  
 
Household size  
 One study found that risk of dropping out increased with each additional 
sibling (Barro and Kolstad, 1987). Another family level factor of school dropout is 
family size or number of siblings in the family. In comparison to children with fewer 
siblings, children with more siblings tend to enroll later, repeat grades more often and 
drop out of school earlier. Similarly, a study found that having a large number of 
siblings (6+) children were associated with a 36 percent increase in the odds of 
dropping out of school, in comparison to the odds for smaller families (Enyegue, 2000). 
Some studies indicate that with larger household sizes (and in particular numbers of 
children) the financial burden/potential workload is greater; children are less likely to 
attend school, and often drop out.  
 
Parental involvement  
 The family engagement is the amount of contact parents or guardians have with 
the school about their child’s academic progress or problems, academic program, or 
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behavior problems. Two studies found a significant relationship between this type of 
family engagement and leaving school prior to graduation (Jimerson, 2000; Rumberger, 
1995). Rumberger (1995) found that students whose parents had not contacted the 
school or teacher about their child’s performance or behavior during their 8th grade year, 
regardless of other family and personal characteristics were significantly more likely to 
drop out. While analyzing the impact of a variety of factors across students’ school 
careers on dropout, one group of researchers found that parent involvement was the 
most important predictor of dropping (Jimerson, 2000).  
 
Parent-child involvement  
 Several studies explored the impact of parent-child relationship about school 
on dropout. Eighth-grade students who had never talked with their parents about high 
school plans were almost six times as likely to drop out as students who regularly had 
conversations with their parents about high school plans (Kaufman et al., 1992). In 
addition, only rarely having conversations about school activities or plans with their 
parents reduced the likelihood that students would drop out to almost the same level as 
students who had more frequent conversations with their parents about school. 
 
Parental decision for early marriage to daughters  
 Another important factor of dropping is parental decision for early marriage for 
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female students  (Kakuru, 2003) explain how early marriage influence children’s 
dropping out of school especially as regards the girl child as it is perceived by parents. 
Odaga and Heneveld (1995), further observed that parents worry about wasting money 
on the education of girls because once married, girls become part of another family and 
the parental investment in them is lost this therefore perpetuates parents discouraging 
the girl child from continuing with school.  
 
Household chores  
 Household chores also influence the likelihood of dropout of girls. Fuller and 
Liang (1999) found that a mother’s participation in the formal wage sector may depress 
a daughter’s likelihood of remaining in school. In this case, daughters may have to take 
on more of the household chores in place of the mother implying that they will have less 
time to go to school. Studies also indicate that girl children frequently drop out of 
school to look after younger siblings (e.g. Brock & Cammish, 1997). 
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2.3. School Domain Factors:  
School relevant factors of early school dropout are schooling costs, structural 
characteristics of schools and school resources.  
 
Schooling costs  
 Studies on schooling cost indicate that direct and indirect schooling costs are 
important factors in whether children enroll in and attend school. Many studies indicate 
that the costs of schooling, including fees, are a central reason for dropping out (Brock 
and Cammish, 1997; Brown and Park., 2002; Colclough et al., 2000; Hunter and May, 
2003). In interviews, parents in Ethiopia often talked about difficulties in paying school 
fees, especially prior to harvest (when they became due); the ability to buy exercise 
books, pens and the necessary clothing for school also influenced whether children 
could enroll or were withdrawn from the first grade (Rose and Samarrai, 2001). Some 
described their children dropping out after enrolment, because they could not meet the 
direct costs of schooling. Additional costs e.g. registration payments, gaining copies of 
birth certificates (for registration), textbooks and uniform costs, were all indirect costs 
many parents in Guinea found difficult to meet. Boyle et al., (2002) research in some 
areas of Uganda and Zambia, the inability to pay school fees meant children 
withdrawing from school. Schooling costs may link with gender patterns of pupils and 
parents are sometimes may less willing to pay fees for girls’ education.  
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Structural Characteristics of Schools  
 Several analyses found that attending rural schools increased the odds of 
dropping out (Levine and Painter., 1999; Marsh, 1991; Sander and Krautmann, 1995). 
Two analyses found that dropout rates were actually lower in urban schools (Heck & 
Mahoe, 2006; Rumberger and Thomas, 2000). And there are four studies found no 
significant effects of school structural characteristics on dropout rates (Rumberger, 
1995; Rumberger and Larson, 1998; Swanson & Schneider, 1999). A number of 
analyses found that dropout rates were lower and graduation rates higher in public 
schools than semi-public schools (Evans and Schwab, 1995; Rumberger and Thomas, 
2000; Rumberger and Larson, 1998; Teachman et al., 1996). Another study found lower 
dropout rates among Catholic schools after controlling for other inputs, but no 
significant effects after controlling for school practices (Rumberger and Palardy, 2005). 
Another study also found no significant effect after controlling for school practices (Lee 
and Burkam, 2003).  
 
School Resources  
 One study found that higher per pupil spending increased graduation rates, 
particularly for students attending rural schools (Roscigno and Crowley, 2001). Two 
studies found higher mean teacher salaries were associated with lower dropout or higher 
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graduation rates (Pirog and Magee, 1997; Rumberger and Palardy, 2005). Again, two 
studies found that a higher student-teacher ratio was associated with higher dropout 
rates (Rumberger and Thomas, 2000).  
 There are a number of studies that examined the relationship between student 
body composition and high school dropout rates. The studies vary extensively in the 
number and types of measures for student body composition. Even after controlling for 
a number of other school characteristics, six studies found several indicators of student 
composition had direct effects on high school dropout rates. These are: Mean of 
socioeconomic status–SES (Rumberger, 1995; Rumberger and Thomas, 2000); the 
proportion of at-risk students (students who get poor grades, cut classes, have discipline 
problems, or were retained (Rumberger, 1995; Rumberger and Thomas, 2000); the 
proportion of racial or linguistic minorities ( Rumberger, 1995; Sander, 2001); the 
proportion of students who had changed schools or residences (Rumberger and Palardy, 
2005; Sander, 2001); and the proportion of students from non-traditional (not both 
parents) families (Rumberger and Palardy, 2005).  
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2.4. Community Domain Factor:  
The foremost community relevant factor of early school dropout is peer effect. 
 
Peer effect  
 In the context of community effects a number of studies have examined the 
relationship between peers and dropout. Peers may influence students’ social and 
academic behaviors, attitudes toward school, and access to resources (social capital) that 
may benefit their education (Ream, 2005 and Stanton, 1997). Some studies found that 
generally having friends (Fagan and Pabon, 1990) or having friends who are interested 
in school (Pittman, 1991) reduces the odds of dropping out. The most consistent finding 
is that having deviant friends—friends who engage in criminal behavior, (Battin 
Pearson et al., 2000; Peck, and Kaplan, 1997) or having friends –friends who have 
dropped out (Saiz and Zoido, 2005; 32 Cairns and Necherman, 1989; Carbonaro, 1998) 
increases the likelihood of dropout.  
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2.5. Limitations in the Literature  
 When reviewing the literature, it can be observed that most studies have been 
performed without considering the gender of the pupils, and very few studies have been 
persuaded on the issue of female dropout. In addition, it also could be observed that 
most of the factors affect the dropout issue regardless gender of pupils in general. 
Although some certain factors have been identified as the origins of female dropout 
rates however, these factors are not adequate to predict the school dropout for girls in 
Bangladesh. For instance, the literature on household labor indicates that girls drop out 
more often due to household chores, but this factor only affects girls’ dropout rates 
when their mothers participate in the formal wage sector. In a developing country such 
as Bangladesh, where most of the mothers are housewives, household chores are not a 
considerable factor to predict dropout rates for girls in general.  
 Although the literature suggests that educational costs influence dropout 
regardless of the gender of the pupil, there may be a link between the gender of the 
pupil because parents may be less willing to pay fees for girls’ education. For example, 
Brown and Park’s (2002) research in rural China indicates that an inability to pay 
schooling costs led to the decision to drop out for 47.00 percent of girls but only 8.00 
percent of boys. Girls require more indirect costs than boys, which may discourage 
parents from educating girls. Although schooling costs are considered the primary 
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reason for girls’ dropout in some societies, this may not be a cause for girls’ school 
dropout in Bangladesh because the government of Bangladesh has reduced schooling 
costs for girls by providing the female scholarship since 1994.  
Teenage pregnancy is another reason for dropout among female pupils. 
Teenage pregnancy, usually called premarital pregnancy, occurs during the schooling 
period of female pupils. However, attitudes toward premarital pregnancy differ in 
various societies. The socio-sexual ideology of a society is the strongest determinant of 
premarital pregnancy; that is, how premarital pregnancy is perceived in a society 
depends on the corresponding norms and values. Although premarital pregnancy is 
common in European, American and some South African societies, traditional social 
norms south Asian developing countries forbid it. In Bangladesh, premarital pregnancy 
is not permitted by religious beliefs because premarital sex is prohibited in Islam. In this 
respect, DeLamater (1981) argued that religion is one of the major sources of norms that 
control sexual expression, including premarital sex and sex socialization. Regnerus and 
Wilson (1998) also argued that religiosity has been associated with conservative beliefs 
about premarital sex and pregnancy. Therefore, it can be argued that premarital teenage 
pregnancy is not a cause for leaving school early among girls in Bangladesh, where 
nearly 90 percent of people belong to the Muslim religion.   
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Several studies indicate that early marriage is the primary reason for girls’ 
school dropout, especially in the developing world. Liyd (2005) provided a global 
review of marriage and education trends in contemporary developing societies and 
found that Bangladesh is the only country in which marriage is a significant reason for 
girls’ dropout from school. Although the literature indicates that parents in Bangladesh 
tend to encourage early marriage for their daughters instead of continuing schooling, 
studies have not examined why parents arrange early marriages for their daughters that 
lead to early dropout from school. Regarding the marriage issue some studies indicate 
that parents invest less in girls’ education because girls become part of another family 
after getting marriage (Odaga and Heneveld, 1995). In this type of society, called a 
virilocal society, parents consider the opportunity cost by calculating the direct and 
indirect costs of schooling for girls, which encourages parents to arrange early 
marriages for their daughters rather than continuing their schooling. Bangladesh is a 
virilocal society, but schooling costs are not a cause of early marriage because the 
government has reduced the bulk of schooling costs for girls by providing female 
scholarships. However, despite these scholarship opportunities, parents arrange early 
marriages for their daughters instead of continuing their schooling, and parents keep 
their daughters in school only until there is a good opportunity for marriage 
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(Scholarship Progress Report 2008). Thus, early marriage is the primary cause of school 
dropout for girls. Despite this situation, there are no empirical findings regarding which 
factors encourage parents to arrange early marriage instead of continuing schooling for 
girls in Bangladesh.  
 As written in chapter 1, dowry and hypergamic tendency play important roles 
when parents arrange early marriages. Thus it is necessary to focus on these factors in 
order to clarify the mechanism that girls tend to dropout from school. In the following 
chapters, this study examines the effects of parental dowry payment expectation and 
expectation for groom’s education level on school dropout for girls (after controlling the 
other relevant factors of school dropout issue). 
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3. Data and Methods  
3.1. Data  
 This study was based on a survey carried out in one of the town zone of the 
sub-district named Pirgonj Upazila of Rangpur District (Map 1 in below) in Bangladesh 
in March, 2013 and the data was collected by conducting the interviews with 
questionnaires. There are 5 secondary schools in the town zone at Pirgonj and all the 
schools were included in the survey were used as a primary source of data. The town 
zone of the sub district was purposely chosen as study area to obtain more 
heterogeneous respondents in the study on the concentration of students’ family 
background characteristics. I observed that student compositions are more heterogen- 
eous in schools which are located in the town zone of sub district. Pirgonj sub district 
was also chosen purposely to obtain more heterogeneous study area while regional 
imbalances continue to exist in Bangladesh. Pirgonj has average literacy rate of 26.50 
percent (7+ years), and which nearby the national average of 32.04 percent. To avoid 
the probability to come any unexpected and deviant area I chose it as a sampling area.  
 The population size was 482 girl students. We contacted all of these girls’ 
parents and among them we got answers from 322 girls’ parents. Thus, the sample size 
of this study was 322 in which 63.66 percent (N = 205) were non-dropout girls and 
36.34 percent (N = 117) were dropout girls.  
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Figure 3-1. Location of Pirgonj Upazila of Rangpur District 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44 
 
3.2. Definition of Variables  
Dropout and non-dropout: Students who were enrolled in grade X were considered to 
have a non-dropout status. In contrast, students who were enrolled in grade VI but not 
been enrolled in the grade X were considered as a dropout status. (In Bangladesh the 
period of secondary school level is from grade VI to grade X.) In this respect, the lists 
of students considered as dropout and non-dropout status have been taken from schools. 
Dropout status was measured as a dummy variable with 1 indicating dropouts and 0 
indicating non-dropouts in this study.  
Dowry payment expectation: Questionnaires were used to ask parents the following 
question: “How much dowry do you expect to pay to marry your daughters?” The 
answers were measured by the amount of money (BDTK) which indicates the name of 
Bangladeshi money called Taka.  
Expectation for groom’s education level: Parents’ expectations for the groom’s 
educational level was evaluated using questionnaires asking, “How educated do you 
expect the groom to be to marry off your daughter?” The answers were measured by the 
years of education.  
Parental income and education: Parental income measured by the total amount of 
monthly income and education measured by the total years of schooling that obtained 
by the parents.  
 45 
 
School engagement of students: School engagement was measured by counting how 
many times a student participated in extracurricular activities in school during the last 
three months and the information collected from the students’ school record books. 
School misbehavior: Problem behavior by students was measured by the total number 
of absent days from school during the last three months, which was collected from the 
students’ school records.  
Working: Working was measured by the students’ total number of hours working 
outside or inside the home in a day.  
Preschool experience: This variable measured whether students had preschool 
experience before getting the legal schooling age which was measured as dummy (Yes 
= 1, No = 0).  
Household size: Household size was measured by the total number of household 
members.  
Parental school involvement: Parental involvement in school was measured by how 
many times parents contacted with the school about their child’s academic progress 
during the last three months. The records were collected from the students’ school 
records.  
Parent-child involvement: Parent-child relationship has been measured by the type of 
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parent-child conversations. Parents were asked how many times in a month they usually 
consult with their children regarding their educational activities.  
School structure: The school structure was measured by the type of funding of the 
school (1 = A public school completely funded by the government, 0 = others).   
School resource: School resource was measured by the number of teachers with 
advanced degrees in belonging schools.  
Peer effect: Peer effect was measured by the number of friends of students those who 
have dropout status. 
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3.3. Analytical Method  
This study used a Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) technique by using the 
Mplus statistical software program (version 7.0) to estimate the associations between 
the variables in the model. This study used SEM technique to conduct the path analysis 
when this study investigated whether groom education level in the marriage mating 
pattern mediates the impact of dowry on school dropout outcome for girls. In this 
respect, SEM improves upon the predictive capacity of multiple regressions by allowing 
for true multivariate estimation including the estimation of direct and indirect effects. 
We conducted two separate Structural Equation Models (SEMs) by using a 
single data set. The first model was aimed to verify the link between the students’ 
parental background factors and school dropout. On the other hand, the second model 
prospectively tested the predictive links between the parental dowry payment 
expectation, their expectation for the educated groom and daughters’ school dropout 
decision. The first model has been considered as a competing model and the second 
model considered as a hypothesized model. We conducted first model to compare the 
results of our hypothesized model since to identify a more appropriate and favorite 
model it is important to compare the results of hypothesized model with the competing 
model. Furthermore, it would also be mentioned that to estimate the results we control 
the relevant variables similarly in both of the models. To compare the models with a 
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different number of parameters we used Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 
1987) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC; Schwartz, 1978). A better fitting model 
is indicated when the absolute values of these indices become smaller in a model.  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 49 
 
4. Analyses  
4.1. Descriptive statistics  
Below two tables show the descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analyses. 
 
Table 4-1. Descriptive statistics of the Variables in the Analysis 
              (N = 322) 
Variables 
 
Mean               Mean 
Dropout 
 
Std. 
Deviation 
Non 
dropout 
Std. 
Deviation 
Dowry payment expectation  
(thousand, BDTK) 
23.79 
 
4.33 
 
55.05 
 
7.74 
 
Expectation for groom’s  
educational level (year) 
8.71 
 
0.97 
 
12.43 
 
1.91 
 
Parental income (thousand, 
BDTK) 11.24 3.95 19.39 6.40 
Parental education (year) 3.50 1.33 8.50 3.57 
Working (hour) 1.94 0.33 1.69 0.52 
Disadvantageous peers 1.51 0.29 1.40 0.32 
School misbehavior (time) 2.51 1.20 1.20 0.60 
School engagement of students  
(time) 
7.38 
 
3.43 
 
10.38 
 
4.47 
 
Parental school involvement 
(time) 1.44 0.81 2.10 1.06 
Parent-child involvement(time) 3.46 1.27 6.84 2.78 
Household size (No. of member) 4.51 1.26 4.41 1.18 
Teacher with advanced degree    4.71     1.73      4.96      1.76 
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Table 4-2. Descriptive statistics of the Categorical Variables in the Analysis  
                                                              (N = 322) 
Variables Dropout N (%) Non-dropout N (%) Total  
School structure    
 Public  16 (33.33) 32 (66.67) 48  
 Otherwise 101 (36.86) 173 (63.14) 274  
Preschool 
experience 
   
 Yes 37 (31.09) 82 (68.91) 119  
 No 80 (39.41) 123 (60.59) 203  
 
Descriptive statistics in table (4-1) shows that parents of dropout group expect 
to pay average 23.79 thousands (BDTK) amount of dowry to their daughters’ marriage. 
In contrast, the parents of non-dropout group expect to pay 55.05 thousands (BDTK) 
amount of dowry which is more than two times higher than the dropout group. In the 
consideration of grooms’ education level, average 12.43 years education have been 
expected by the parents of dropout group in which parents of non-dropout group expect 
average 8.71 years educated grooms to their daughters’ be married. The average 
monthly income of dropout group is 11.24 thousands (BDTK). In contrast, the parents 
of non-dropout group monthly earn average 19.39 thousands (BDTK). In respect to 
parental education descriptive statistics shows that parental average education level for 
the dropout group is 3.50 years, in contrast to 8.50 years for the parents of non-dropout 
group. The average working hours for the dropout group is 1.94 hours and non-dropout 
group is 1.69 hours. The dropout group has average 1.51 peers who have dropout status; 
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in contrast, the non-dropout group has average 1.40 peers. The dropout group has 
average 2.51 times school misbehavior; in contrast the non-dropout group has average 
1.20 times. The average school engagement for the dropout group is 7.38 times in which 
for the non-dropout group is 10.38 times. Parents of the dropout group contact to school 
average 1.44 times in which parents of the non-dropout group contact average 2.10 
times. Parents of dropout group converse with their children 3.46 times in which parents 
of non dropout group contact 6.84 times. The average number of household members of 
the dropout group is 4.51 persons in contrast for the non-dropout group is 4.41 persons. 
The average teacher with advanced degree for the dropout group is 4.71 persons which 
for the non dropout group is 4.96 persons.  
 Descriptive statistics for the categorical variables (table 4-2) show that the total 
number of students from public schools are 48 persons in which 33.33 percent (N = 16) 
students with dropout status and 66.67 percent (N = 32) is the students with non-dropout 
status. The total number of students with preschool experience are 119 persons in which 
31.09 percent (N= 37) is students with the dropout status and 68.91 percent (N = 82) is 
the students with non-dropout status. 
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4.2. Multivariate Analysis  
4.2.1. Model 1 (competing model): 
Results in competing model (figure 4-1, next page) show that both of parental 
income (β = - 0.01) and educational level (β = - 0.01) negatively impact on the dropout 
outcome. Furthermore, it also can be observed that both of the coefficients are not 
statistically significant and therefore, it can be argued that parental income and 
educational level have not the direct impacts on the daughters’ school dropout outcome 
in general. The absolute values of AIC and BIC are 20794.838 and 20944.938 
respectively. 
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FIGURE 4-1. The Structural Equation Model (SEM) Shows the Direct Effects of 
Parental Income and Educational Level to Predict Girls’ School Dropout Rates in 
Pirgonj, Bangladesh. (Source: Author’s data) 
1 
-2log-likelihood = 20690.838, Number of free parameters = 52, AIC = 20794.838, 
BIC = 20944.938 
*** P < 0.001 
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4.2.2. Model 2 (hypothesized model): 
Our hypothesized model (figure 4-2) is relatively a good fitted model compared 
with competing model. This is because; the absolute values of AIC and BIC of our 
competing model are 20794.838 and 20944.938 respectively. In contrast, the absolute 
values of AIC and BIC for the hypothesized model (model 2) are 15561.552 and 
15727.632 respectively which are smaller compared with the competing model. A good 
fit is indicated when absolute values of these indices become smaller in the model. 
Hence, our hypothesized model fits the data adequately and the results of this model are 
certainly appropriate compared with our competing model. (Note: Full results of this 
model are available in appendix table A-1, p, 69)   
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FIGURE 4-2. The Structural Equation Model (SEM) Shows the Effects of Dowry 
Payment and Grooms’ Education Level to Predict Girls’ School Dropout Rates in 
Pirgonj, Bangladesh. (Source: Author’s data) 
2
-2log-likelihood = 15473.552, Number of free parameters = 44, AIC = 15561.552 
BIC = 15727.632,  
*** P < 0.001 
Results in the hypothesized model show that parents’ expectations for the 
groom’s educational level have a negative and significant causal impact on the dropout 
outcome (β = - 0.80, P < 0.001). Hence, parents’ expectations for the highly educated 
grooms reduce the likelihood of their daughters’ school dropout and this result supports 
our hypothesis 1. In addition to that point it would be observed that this impact 
significantly mediated by the parents’ dowry payment expectation when dowry payment 
expectation has a positive direct effect (β = 0. 51) on the grooms’ education level. This 
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result is statistically significant (P < 0.001) and supports our hypothesis 2. Hence, 
parents who have higher dowry payment expectation they expect for the highly 
educated grooms which reduce the dropout rate. Therefore, parents’ dowry payment 
expectations indirectly impact on the dropout outcome for the girls in Bangladesh. In 
this respect, the indirect effect of the dowry payment expectation on the dropout 
outcome also has been measured in this study. The result shows that dowry payment 
expectation negatively (indirectly) impacts on the dropout outcome and this results is 
statistically significant (β = -0.32, P < 0.001) and supports our hypothesis 3. Therefore, 
parental higher dowry payment expectation indirectly reduces the dropout rate and this 
effect is mediated by the expectation for grooms’ educational level in Bangladesh.  
Results in the model also show that parental dowry payment expectations and 
their expectations for the educated grooms vary by their background factors. In this 
respect, parental education directly and positively impacts on the groom education level 
(β = 0.64, P < 0.001). Hence, if parents have higher education level, also expect for the 
highly educated grooms and this result supports our hypothesis 4. . In the respect of 
dowry payment expectation result shows that parental income has a positive causal 
effect on the dowry payment expectation (β = 0.79, P < 0.001) which implies that if 
parents have higher level of income they also have higher dowry payment expectation 
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and this result also supports our hypothesis 5. In addition, the results also show that 
parents’ income and education have negative direct effects (β = -0.08, and β = -0.02 
respectively) on the daughters’ dropout outcome. It would be observed that though 
parental income and education have direct effects on the dropout outcome however, 
these effects are not statistically significant. Several of literature on the parental 
background factors explored that parental background factors significantly impacts on 
the dropout outcome. However, the effects of parental background factors in our study 
are not statistically significant this is because cultural factors of marriage play the 
crucial roles in the girls schooling attainment in Bangladesh. In this respect, the custom 
of the dowry payment and the norm of hypergamic tendency in the marriage matching 
pattern have important role to improve the dropout outcome for the girls. Hence, the 
effect of parental background factors on the daughters’ dropout mediated by the cultural 
background factors of marriage in Bangladesh.  
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5. Discussion  
 The analyses of this study indicate that dowry payment expectation and the 
expectation for highly educated groom are necessary for the educational attainment of 
girls when considering their marriage. Dowry is an economic transfer from one family 
to another family. Therefore, how much dowry will be paid and how much educated 
grooms will be expected by parents in the marriage market to daughters’ marry both are 
associated with parental socioeconomic backgrounds. Several reasons may explain why 
parents’ dowry payment expectation and the expectation for the educated grooms differ 
with their backgrounds. For instances, parents those who have a higher educational 
level typically prefer highly educated grooms. These parents usually prefer grooms with 
urban jobs, which provide higher, more secure incomes that are paid monthly and are 
not subject to seasonal variations. The wives of such men will be freed from the 
“drudgery” of rural work and an uncomfortable lifestyle. The highly educated parents 
are generally identified as middle class and have higher social status compared the 
lower educated parents which encourage to the highly educated grooms to marry their 
daughters. On the other hand, the lower educated parents, who typically have a lower 
social status than the highly educated parents do, consequently experience greater 
difficulties in finding a potential marriage partner for their educated daughters within 
their limited social boundaries. In this respect, Milner (1988) clearly demonstrated in 
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his status alliance theory that associating with individuals with a higher social status 
tends to increase one’s social status while associating with individuals with a lower 
social status tends to reduce one’s social status. Thus, individuals with a lower social 
status usually try to increase their associations with individuals with a higher social 
status, while individuals with a higher social status carefully limit and regulate their 
associations with individuals with a lower social status. These contradictory interests 
tend to result in social associations among individuals who are approximately equal in 
social status, thereby establishing a strong tendency toward status homogeneity. The 
probability of status homogeneity disintegrating or of individuals moving toward a 
higher social status is low for parents with a lower social status. Consequently, parents 
with lower status face challenges in finding an educated groom with a higher social 
status. Mare (1981) argued that because individuals tend to marry within similar social 
groups (homogamy) or to marry a person who is close in social status to them, parents 
may feel pressured to pair their higher-educated daughters with grooms with a higher 
social status if the bride’s parents have a low social status for the lacking of 
opportunities.  
 Additionally, when grooms are highly educated but have a social status that is 
lower than the bride’s social status, they nonetheless are likely to marry brides with a 
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higher social status than theirs. For instance, if grooms are qualified or highly educated 
but with lower family background status are more likely to marry brides who are with 
employee family background. In this situation though grooms are with lower family 
background, however, they begin to consider as higher status themselves. These kinds 
of grooms (with lower family status than brides) require a lower dowry payment when 
they marry brides whose families have a higher social status. According to the status 
alliance theory, associating with individuals with a higher social status is difficult for 
individuals with a low social status. However, grooms who are qualified or are highly 
educated but who have a lower social status than brides may use their qualification to 
initiate an association or to gain a higher social status by marrying brides with a higher 
social status. Therefore, the marriage market for daughters becomes more limited for the 
parents who have lower status than the parents who have higher status and consequently, 
they feel a lack of opportunities to pair their educated daughters with educated grooms. 
The extent of the difficulties that parents experience in finding suitors for their educated 
daughters depend on their daughters’ educational attainment, as grooms must be equally 
or more highly educated than brides based on the hypergamic tendency in the marriage 
market in Bangladesh. Thus, parents those have lower background status need more 
dowry payment than those have comparatively higher status to mating educated 
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daughters with the equally or more highly educated grooms.  
 Parents’ dowry payment expectation is also determined in conjunction with 
parental income level as dowry payments are economic transfers from one family to 
another family (Becker, 1981). In this respect, parents who have lower income levels 
typically experience difficulties to accumulate the amount of dowry and sometime sell 
their assets which limit their economic resources and reduce current income levels. 
However, parents with higher income levels experience less difficulty because the 
economic transfer of the dowry payment does not affect their economic or income 
resources. In other words, the custom of dowry payments force parents to accumulate 
money that is used as capital in other families. The transformation of this capital may 
detrimentally affect parents’ main source of income or whose occupation is commerce. 
In fact, parents usually accumulate the dowry amount in various ways, and the 
complexity of accumulation sometime becomes related to parents’ job qualities or 
employment status. For instance, among parents who accumulate the dowry amount 
from their savings, parents’ experiences differ because the quality of savings varies with 
job qualities and income level. In Bangladesh, most of the self-employed people are 
agriculture workers and they usually experience a lower income than the people who 
with employee status. Consequently, compared with parents with an employed status, 
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parents with a self-employed status feel more difficulties to accumulate the dowry 
amount in the marriage market which discourages girls’ education in Bangladesh. 
Botticini and Andeson (2003) also demonstrated that in a virilocal society, after a girl 
moves to the groom’s household (after being married off), her parents’ decision 
regarding the dowry amount differently benefits the daughter, depending on the parents’ 
background factors. Parents try to reduce the dowry amount as they consider their 
old-age support and future life.  
 It would be mentioned that parents of dropped out girls’ answer of the 
questionnaires of their dowry payment and groom educational level after dropping out 
their daughters. The answers may be affected by the factors their daughters have already 
been dropped out. Therefore, to make clear direction of causality we need to check the 
effect of dropout on groom educational level and dowry payment expectation. In this 
respect, we conduct a reversed model to check the effect (which is available in appendix, 
ii, p, 73).The results of this model show that dropout significantly impacts on the groom 
educational level and dowry payment expectation. Though dropout significantly impacts 
on the groom educational level and dowry payment expectation, however this model is 
not an acceptable model. This is because the AIC and BIC values of this model 
(15689.776 and 15859.631 respectively) become greater compare to our hypothesized 
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model (15561.552 and 15727.632 respectively) which indicate to avoid the results of 
this mode. Therefore, the AIC and BIC values of out hypothesized model (model 2) 
indicate to accept the results appropriately compared with the results of other models in 
this study.   
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6. Conclusion  
This study pursued to find out how parental dowry payment expectation and the 
expectation for groom education level for daughters’ marriage impact on the outcome of 
dropout for girls. The results show that parental dowry payment expectation indirectly 
impact on girls’ dropout rate and this effect is mediated by the expectation for the groom 
education. Hence, parental dowry payment expectation and the expectation for educated 
grooms have important impacts to daughters’ schooling attainment when parents 
consider the marriage of daughters. The prevalence of the custom of dowry payment 
plays a crucial role in improving the girls’ schooling in Bangladesh when dowry amount 
is relevant with parental backgrounds. The custom of the dowry payment to the 
marriage hinders girls’ education when parents have lower income. A large amount of 
dowry hinders improvement in girls’ education if parents have lower income level this 
is because parents with lower income level cannot afford large amounts of dowry for 
their educated girls to marry with the educated grooms. On the one hand when parents’ 
education have a causal impact on the groom education level, then, it can be argued that 
if parents have a higher level of education do not experience difficulties in marring their 
educated daughters with the educated grooms. Therefore, girls deprived of schooling 
continuation by those parents that have either a lower level of education or a lower 
income level and this situation is raised for the social and cultural practices of dowry 
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and hypergamic tendency in marriage mating pattern of Bangladesh. 
Thus, parents with higher/middle class socioeconomic backgrounds favor 
educational attainment for girls more than parents with lower socioeconomic 
backgrounds in the context of dowry payments and norm of hypergamy to the marriage 
market in Bangladesh. Consequently, despite taking action by the government (the 
female subsidy program) to improve the educational attainment of girls, the policy 
cannot prevent the dropout rate for girls significantly. This is because, this action 
benefits more to girls with high /middle class background than girls with lower class 
background when parents with lower class backgrounds prefer early marriage instead of 
schooling to prevent the dowry inflation to daughters’ marry. In sum, the cultural 
background of the marriage market leads to a higher school dropout rate for girls in 
Bangladesh. Therefore, to reduce higher dropout rate for girls in Bangladesh, it is 
important to diminish the custom of dowry payment and the hypergamic tendency from 
the marriage market as well. There are some factors influences to take the dowry by 
grooms’ parents from brides’ parents. For instance, though the government has been 
providing the subsidy only for girls’ education but not for boys’ education and therefore, 
parents have more expenses educating to the boys. Hence, the groom’s parents have had 
substantial investments for upbringing as a qualified groom to their sons. In this case, 
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the parental educational investments in the groom’s education benefit to the bride in 
their conjugal life. This is because after getting marriage a girl belongs as a member to 
the husband’s household and husband (and his family) will be responsible for 
throughout her life. The earnings of a qualified groom can affect the quality of the 
bride’s life style. Therefore, the groom’s parents expect to be reimbursed for the amount 
of the educational expenses by the bride’s parent which is the foremost underlying 
cause of dowry existing in the marriage market in Bangladesh.  
Bangladesh has a large gender disparity in labor force participation, and 
women have more unequal access than men in the labor market (Labor Survey Report, 
Bangladesh, 2001). Consequently, after getting marriage groom becomes responsible 
for bride in general which gives the inspiration to take dowry by groom from bride’s 
parent. Therefore, to improve the higher school dropout for girls in Bangladesh, this 
study suggests implementing the two foremost policies. One is to reduce the cost of 
male schooling as like as for female schooling in the developing country of Bangladesh 
which would be discouraged taking the dowry by the groom’s parents from the bride’s 
parents. The other proposal is that government should take proper steps to reduce the 
gender disparity in the labor force when a bride with a job can pay a lower or no dowry 
to her marriage.  
 67 
 
 Although, the Government has taken the policy, the dropout rate for girls still 
remains substantially higher since the policy still cannot prevent the problem of school 
dropout for girls in Bangladesh. In this situation, the findings of this study may provide 
policymakers with a better understanding of the underlying causes of dropout and may 
contribute to the appropriate actions to reduce the dropout problem among girls. The 
results of this study may also provide direction to scholars in determining the 
underlying causes of early marriage for young girls when early marriage affects millions 
of children throughout the world that is widely practiced in South Asian countries. In 
addition, as a means of preventing the dropout problem, the school social workers serve 
as mediators, negotiators and consultants for students, their families and school 
personnel. Findings of this study can provide better understanding to the school social 
workers to find out how socio-cultural issues discourage parents to enhance female 
education. In sum, the findings of this study can extend the boundaries of the literature 
on the school dropout phenomenon since most of the previous studies have not been 
considered for gender specification. In other words, although the dropout rate among 
female pupil is a chronic problem particularly in the developing regions of the world, 
the literature is extremely limited on the dropout issue especially for female pupils. This 
study has been emphasized on the cultural background of marriage as the foremost 
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determinant of school dropout among female pupils, which is a unique attempt to 
identify the underlying causes of girls’ school dropout behavior. This study has been 
performed by using a small sampling area. The techniques of this study can be 
directions for the future studies to explore the dropout issue by using the wider 
sampling regions.  
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Appendix (i) 
Table A-1. Model Results 
Variables   
 Standardized Coefficient 
(β) 
Std.Error 
(S.E) 
   P 
Value 
Dropout ON 
    
Parental income -0.08 0.09 0.39 
Parental education -0.02 0.08 0.77 
Groom education level -0.80 0.10 0.00 
School structure -0.05 0.05 0.38 
School resource -0.03 0.06 0.63 
School misbehavior 0.07 0.06 0.19 
Parental school involvement -0.07 0.05 0.11 
Student school engagement  -0.10 0.04 0.03 
Household size 0.05 0.05 0.32 
Parent-child involvement -0.18 0.05 0.00 
Student working hour  0.03 0.05 0.53 
Preschool experience -0.01 0.05 0.83 
Peer effect 0.01 0.05 0.87 
Groom Education Level ON 
   
Dowry payment expectation 0.51 0.03 0.00 
Parental education 0.64 0.03 0.00 
Dowry payment expectation ON 
   
Parental income 0.79 0.02 0.00 
School Misbehavior ON 
   
Parental income -0.12 0.05 0.03 
Parental School Involvement ON 
   
Parental income 0.20 0.05 0.00 
Parent-Child Involvement ON 
   
Parental income 0.28 0.05 0.00 
                    (Continued) 
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Table A-1 will be continued 
Variables (β) (S.E) 
P 
Value 
Preschool Experience ON 
Parental income 
Student School Engagement ON 
0.01 0.06 0.95 
Parental education 0.37 0.05 0.00 
Student Working Hour ON 
   
Parental income -0.01 0.06 0.88 
Parental income with 
Parental education 
   
0.19 0.05 0.00 
                         Model Fit Information 
Number of free parameters 
-2log-likelihood  
AIC                              
44 
15473.552 
15561.552 
BIC 15727.632 
Sample size = 322 
 
To estimate the most perfect effects of research variables on the outcome it has 
been controlled the relevant variables in the model. Results (in table A-1) of these 
variables in the model show that school structure negatively effects on the dropout 
outcome. The negative coefficient of school structure (β = -0.05) indicates that students 
are less likely to drop out in the public schools than the other schools however this 
effect is not statistically significant. The negative coefficient of school resource (β = 
-0.03) indicates that the numbers of teachers with advanced educational background in 
school reduce the likelihood of dropout but this result is also not statistically significant. 
School misbehavior positively impacts on the dropout outcome (β = 0.07) and this effect 
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is not statistically significant. Parental school involvement negatively effects (β = -0.07) 
the dropout and but this result is not statistically significant. The positive coefficient of 
household size (β = 0.05) implies that if the number of household members become 
higher, the rate of dropout also become higher but this result is not statistically 
significant. The positive coefficient of working hour (β = 0.03) implies that if the 
students’ working hour increase, dropout rate also increases but this result is not 
statistically significant in this study. The negative coefficient (-0.01) of preschool 
experience implies that students’ who have preschooling before legal schooling age are 
less likely to dropout than those who have not but this result is also not statistically 
significant in this study. The positive coefficient of peer effect (β = 0.01) implies that if 
the participants’ number of dropped out peers increases, the likelihood of dropout rate 
also increases but this result is not statistically significant.  
Results in the model also show that parental background factors also have direct 
impacts on the control variables. Results show that parental income significantly and 
negatively effects on the students’ school misbehavior issue (β = -0.12, P < 0.05); 
significantly and positively effects on the parental school involvement issue (β = 0.20, P 
< 0.001); significantly and positively effects on the parent-child involvement issue (β = 
0.28, P < 0.001). Parental income also insignificantly and positively impacts on children 
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preschool experience (β = 0.01); significantly and negatively effects on the students’ 
working hour (β = - 0.37). Moreover, parental education level significantly and 
positively effects on the students’ engagement issue (β = 0.19, P < 0.001) 
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Appendix (ii)  
Reversed Model: 
Dowry 
Payment 
Expectation
Parental
Education
Groom 
Educational
Level
Parental
Income
Dropout
0.22***-0.50***
0
.1
9
*
*
*
 
FIGURE 4-2. The Structural Equation Model (SEM) Shows Effect of Dropout on 
and Grooms’ Educational Level and Dowry Payment to Predict Girls’ School 
Dropout Rates in Pirgonj, Bangladesh. (Source: Author’s data)  
1
-2log-likelihood = 15599.776, AIC = 15689.776, BIC = 15859.631 
*** P < 0.001 
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Appendix (iii) 
Mechanism of Female Hypergamy and Dowry in the marriage market  
 The conceptual framework of the mechanism of hypergamy and dowry make a 
clear concept how dowry increased steeply with the enhancement of education level of 
women when the norm of female hypergamy prevalence in marriage mating pattern in 
Bangladesh. (Figure is available in the next page) 
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Figure A-2. Conceptual Framework on Mechanism of Hypergamy and Dowry. 
 In this framework education level of women (W) and men (M) have been 
considered from 6 years to 18 years and dowry referred as D1 to D12 from lower to 
higher in amount to get the account how dowry increase with the advancement of 
women  
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 In this framework education level of women (W) and men (M) have been 
considered from 6 years to 18 years and dowry referred as D1 to D12 from lower 
tohigher in amount to get the account how dowry increase with the advancement of 
women education in Bangladesh. The amount of dowry determined into two phases, one 
is equally hypergamic pairs and another one is unequally hypergamic pairs. When 
marriage happened between the equally educated pairs such as W1 and M1, W2 and M2, 
W3 and M3, W4 and M4, W5 and M5, W6 and M6, and W7 and M7 referred as equally 
hypergamic pairs which mentioned as alphabetically H1a to H1g. Alongside, when 
marriage happened between the unequally educated pairs such as W1 and M2, W2 and 
M5, W3 and M4, W4 and M7, W5 and M6 referred as unequally hypergamic pairs which 
mentioned as H2a, H2b, H2c, H3a and H3 in the framework. This framework shows some 
mechanism of hypergamy and dowry when marriage happened in equally or unequally 
educated groups these are:  
 If the education level increased for men, the amount of dowry also increased in 
marriage market. For instance in this framework when education level increase for 
M1 to M7 from 6 years to 18 years dowry also increase from D1 to D12 respectively. 
(In this regard Arends -Kuenning and Amin, 2001 and Imam, 2006 also argued 
that amount of dowry determined by the quality of grooms).  
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 When women’s education level increased, the amount of dowry also increased 
since women require equal or higher level educated men than her to marry for the 
norm 
of hypergamy in marriage market. For instance in this framework when education level 
increased for W1 to W7 dowry also increased from D1 to D12 respectively to her marry.  
 Amount of dowry is lower in equally educated pairs than unequally educated pairs. 
For instance dowries are lower in H1a to H1g respectively than H2a, H2b, H2c, H3a 
and H3.  
 More distance the men’s education level from women’s’ education dowry also 
becomes steeply higher. It means if women become more hypergamous the 
amount of dowry also increased more. For instance amount of dowry is higher in 
H3a and H3 then H2a, H2b, and H2c  
 Although amount of dowry is lower in equally educated pair groups than 
unequally educated pairs however dowry also becomes higher when the education 
levels increase in equally educated pairs. For instance dowries steeply increase 
from H1a to H1g from D1 to D2, D4 to D5, D7 to D8 and D8 to D10 for H1a to H1g 
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 Thus, the mechanisms of hypergamy and dowry in marriage market make a 
clear concept that further educated girls’ require further amount of dowry to her 
marry and daughters’ educational attainment allied with parents’ dowry payment 
intention  when parents control the time of marriage decision of daughters. In 
other word for daughters’ schooling attainment parents need to be highly expected 
for educated grooms. 
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